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 Teaching may be the most-scrutinized occupation in the economy.  Over the past four 
decades, empirical researchers—many of them economists—have accumulated an impressive 
amount of evidence on teachers:  the heterogeneity in teacher productivity, the rise in 
productivity associated with teaching credentials and on-the-job experience, rates of turnover, 
the costs of recruitment, the relationship between supply and quality, the effect of class size and 
the monetary value of academic achievement gains over a student’s lifetime.  Since the passage 
of the No Child Left Behind Act, along with a number of state-level educational initiatives, the 
data needed to estimate individual teacher performance based on student achievement gains have 
become more widely available. However, there have been relatively few efforts to examine the 
implications of this voluminous literature on teacher performance. In this paper, we ask what the 
existing evidence implies for how school leaders might recruit, evaluate, and retain teachers.  
We begin by summarizing the evidence on five key points, referring to existing work and 
to evidence we have accumulated from our research with the nation’s two largest school districts: 
Los Angeles and New York City. First, teachers display considerable heterogeneity in their 
effects on student achievement gains. The standard deviation across teachers in their impact on 
student achievement gains is on the order of 0.1 to 0.2 student-level standard deviations, which 
would improve the median student’s test score 4 to 8 percentiles in a single year.1 Second, 
                                                 
1 The metric of standard deviations is commonly used to assess the effect of educational 
interventions, and we will use it throughout this paper.  To provide some context for readers 
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estimates of teacher effectiveness based on student achievement data are noisy measures and can 
be thought of as having reliability in the range of 30 to 50 percent. Third, teachers’ effectiveness 
rises rapidly in the first year or two of their teaching careers but then quickly levels out. Fourth, 
the primary cost of teacher turnover is not the direct cost of hiring and firing, but rather is the 
loss to students who will be taught by a novice teacher rather than one with several years of 
experience. Fifth, it is difficult to identify those teachers who will prove more effective at the 
time of hire. As a result, better teachers can only be identified after some evidence on their actual 
job performance has accumulated.   
We then explore what these facts imply for how principals and school districts should act, 
using a simple model in which schools must search for teachers using noisy signals of teacher 
effectiveness. Due to a lack of information available at the time of hire, we will argue for a hiring 
process that is not highly selective—that is, while it might require evidence of general 
educational achievement like a college degree, it would not require individuals to make costly 
up-front specific investments before being permitted to teach. We then argue that, given the 
substantial observed heterogeneity of teacher effects, the modest rise in productivity with on-the-
job experience, and the fact that tenure is a lifetime job, tenure protections should be limited to 
those who meet a very high bar.  Even with the imprecise estimates of teacher effectiveness 
currently available, our simulations suggest that a strategy that would sample extensively from 
the pool of potential teachers but offer tenure only to a small percentage could yield substantial 
annual gains in student achievement.   
 The implications of our analysis are strikingly different from current practice. Schools 
and school districts attempt to screen at the point of hiring and require significant investment in 
education-specific coursework but then grant tenure status to teachers as a matter of course after 
two to three years on the job. Performance evaluation is typically a perfunctory exercise and, at 
least officially, very few teachers are considered ineffective (Weisberg, Sexton, Mulhern, and 
Keeling, 2009). Rather than screening at the time of hire, the evidence on heterogeneity of 
teacher performance suggests a better strategy would be identifying large differences between 
                                                                                                                                                             
unversed in this literature, the gap in achievement between poor and nonpoor students (or 
between black and white students) in the United States is roughly 0.8–0.9 standard deviations 
(authors’ calculations based on data from the 2009 National Assessment of Educational 
Progress). 
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teachers by observing the first few years of teaching performance and retaining only the highest-
performing teachers. 
 
Five Facts about Teacher Effectiveness 
 
Any approach to recruiting and retaining teachers is based, at least implicitly, on a set of 
beliefs. Here, we describe the evidence on five key parameters regarding teacher effectiveness.  
 
Fact 1: Teacher Productivity Based on Gains in Student Achievement is Heterogeneous. 
 The fact that teachers are heterogeneous in their productivity suggests that there are 
potentially large gains to students if it is possible for school leaders to attract and retain highly 
effective teachers, and conversely to discourage or at least to avoid giving tenure to ineffective 
teachers.  
More than three decades ago, Hanushek (1971) and Murnane (1975) were the first 
economists to report large differences in student achievement in different teachers’ classrooms, 
even after controlling for students’ prior achievement and characteristics.  That literature has 
accelerated in recent years.   Especially following the No Child Left Behind Act, many states and 
school districts began collecting annual data on students and matching it to teachers.2 Research 
has produced remarkably consistent estimates of the heterogeneity in teacher impacts in different 
sites.   For example, using data from Texas, Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005) find that a 
standard deviation in teacher quality is associated with 0.11 student-level standard deviations in 
math and 0.095 standard deviations in reading.  Using data from two school districts in New 
Jersey, Rockoff (2004) reports that one standard deviation in teacher effects is associated with a 
                                                 
2 The data requirements for measuring heterogeneity in teaching effectiveness are high.  First, 
one needs longitudinal data on achievement for individual students matched to specific teachers.  
Second, achievement data are needed on an annual basis to be able to track gains for each student 
over a single school year.   (Prior to the No Child Left Behind legislation, many states tested at 
longer intervals, such as fourth and eighth grade.)  Third, panel data on teachers are required as 
well, to be able to track performance of individual teachers over time. Teacher-level panel data 
are needed to account for school-level or classroom-level shocks to student achievement that 
contribute to the measurement error in classroom-level measures. In this journal, Kane and 
Staiger (2002) showed that conventional estimates of sampling error cannot account for the lack 
of persistence in school-level value-added estimates. There appear to be other school-level and 
classroom-level sources of error. 
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0.1 student-level standard deviation in achievement. Using data from Chicago, Aaronson, 
Barrow, and Sander (2007) report that a standard deviation in teacher quality is associated with a 
difference in math performance of 0.09 to 0.16 student-level standard deviations.3   
 How much should we care about these differences in effectiveness across teachers?  To 
attach an approximate dollar value to them, one needs an estimate of the value of student 
achievement over the course of a student’s lifetime.  There is a long tradition in labor economics 
estimating the relationship between various types of test scores and the earnings of early-career 
workers (for example, Murnane, Willett, and Levy, 1995; Neal and Johnson, 1996).4  Kane and 
Staiger (2002) estimated that the value of a one standard deviation gain in math scores would 
have been worth $110,000 at age 18 using the Murnane et al. estimates, and $256,000 using the 
Neal and Johnson results.  This implies that a one standard deviation increase in teacher 
effectiveness (that is, one that leads to an increase of about 0.15 standard deviations of student 
achievement for 20 students) has a value of around $330,000 to $760,000.  
As several recent papers remind us, the statistical assumptions required for the 
identification of causal teacher effects with observational data are extraordinarily strong and 
rarely tested (Andrabi, Das, Khwaja, and Zajonc, 2009; McCaffrey, Lockwood, Koretz, Louis, 
and Hamilton, 2004; Raudenbush, 2004; Rothstein, 2010; Rubin, Stuart, and Zanutto, 2004; 
Todd and Wolpin, 2003).  Teachers may be assigned classrooms of students that differ in 
unmeasured ways—such as consisting of more motivated students, or students with stronger 
                                                 
3 Aaronson, Barrow, and Sander (2007) report the variance in teacher quality to be .02 to .06 
grade-level equivalents (adjusted for sampling error). In table 1, they report the standard 
deviation in grade-level equivalents of 8th grade students to be 1.55  
( . / . . , . / . .02 155 09 06 155 16= = ). Their study adjusted for sampling variation, but not for other 
classroom level sources of error. 
4 Murnane, Willett, and Levy (1995) estimate that a one standard deviation difference in math 
test performance is associated with an 8 percent hourly wage increase for men and a 12.6 percent 
increase in for women. These estimates may understate the value of academic achievement since 
the authors also control for years of schooling completed. Neal and Johnson (1996), who do not 
condition on educational attainment, estimate that an improvement of one standard deviation in 
test performance is associated with 18.7 and 25.6 percent increases in hourly wages for men and 
women, respectively.  Of course, the cross-sectional relationship between tested achievement and 
earnings may overstate the causal value of academic achievement.  However, while there have 
been attempts to estimate the causal value of years of schooling, we are not aware of estimates of 
the causal value of academic achievement. 
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unmeasured prior achievement or more engaged parents—that result in varying student 
achievement gains.   
 Despite these concerns, several pieces of evidence suggest that the magnitude of variation 
in teacher effects is driven by real differences in teacher quality.  First, estimates tend to be 
highly correlated across a wide variety of specifications (Harris and Sass, 2006).  Second, 
researchers have consistently found strong correlations between teacher effect estimates and 
evaluations made by school principals and other professional educators (Murnane, 1975; Jacob 
and Lefgren, 2008; Harris and Sass, 2009; Rockoff and Speroni, 2010; Tyler, Taylor, Kane, and 
Wooten, 2010).  Third, while most studies of teacher effects rely on assumptions regarding 
matching of students with teachers at the classroom level, Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005) 
use a completely different approach that does not rely on this assumption and find similar 
estimates to the rest of the literature.   
Finally, two studies based on random assignment of teachers to classrooms have found 
variation in teacher effects consistent with nonexperimental estimates, suggesting that estimated 
differences in teacher effectiveness are not driven by student sorting.  Nye, Konstantopoulos, and 
Hedges (2004) reexamined data from the Tennessee STAR classroom size experiment, in which 
teachers were randomly assigned to classes of a given size.  The differences in classroom-level 
student achievement that emerged within given class size groups were larger than would have 
been expected to occur due to chance and strikingly similar in magnitude to those estimated in 
nonexperimental studies.  Kane and Staiger (2008) study a recent experiment in Los Angeles 
Unified School District in which pairs of teachers were randomly assigned to classrooms within 
the same elementary school and grade. They found that nonexperimental value-added estimates 
from a pre-experimental period were able to predict student achievement differences following 
random assignment: a one-point difference between randomly-assigned teachers in pre-
experimental value added was associated with a one-point difference in student achievement 
following random assignment.  Thus, the nonexperimental estimates for individual teachers were 
unbiased predictors of a teacher’s impact on student achievement in the experiment. 
 
Fact 2: Estimates of Heterogeneous Teacher Effects Include a Substantial Noise 
Component. 
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 Ideally, estimates of the amount that teachers affect student achievement would be the 
same across classrooms or from year to year within the same teacher, but this does not hold true 
in practice. The error in estimates of teacher effects on student achievement derives from at least 
two sources.  The first is sampling variation.  The typical elementary classroom may have 20 to 
25 students per year (although middle and high school teachers have somewhat larger classes and 
typically teach multiple sections). With samples of such modest size, naturally occurring 
variation in the make-up of a teacher’s classroom from year to year will produce variation in a 
teacher’s estimated effect.   However, volatility in teacher (and school) effects exceeds that 
predicted by sampling error alone (Kane and Staiger, 2002; Kane, Rockoff, and Staiger, 2008).   
The source of this second type of error—which can perhaps more accurately be thought of as 
nonpersistent variation in estimates of teacher effects on student achievement—could include a 
broad range of factors influencing the measured achievement gains of groups of students: for 
example, interactions between a specific teacher’s lesson plans and the test used in a given year, 
an (unpredictably) disruptive student that drags down his/her classmates, a dog-barking in the 
parking lot on the day of the test, or more mysterious forces that fall under the broad category of 
“classroom chemistry.” 
 For present purposes, any nonpersistent variation in a teacher’s measured impact on 
student achievement represents estimation error. One approach to estimating the proportion of 
variance due to nonpersistent sources is to study the correlation in estimated impacts across 
classrooms taught by the same teacher.  If a teacher’s estimated impact, Yt, represents the sum of 
a persistent component, µ, and an uncorrelated nonpersistent error, εt, then the correlation 
between the estimated effect this year and last year—that is, between Yt and Yt – 1—represents an 
estimate of the reliability of the teacher-level estimate in any given year. Table 1 reports the 
standard deviation in estimated teacher effects, the estimated reliability (as measured by the 
correlation across classrooms taught by the same teacher), and implied standard deviation in true 
teacher impacts (σµ) for teachers in two school districts: Los Angeles Unified and New York 
City. When reported in terms of the student-level standard deviation in test scores in a given 
grade and subject, the standard deviation in estimated value added for teachers was remarkably 
similar in the two districts, with estimates in both math and English Language Arts in the narrow 
range from .23 to .27.   Although the estimated reliability of teacher effects was higher in math 
than in English Language Arts, and higher in Los Angeles than in New York City, all the 
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reliability estimates suggest that there is considerable error or volatility in the teacher impact 
estimates. Indeed, more than half of the variation in estimated impacts in math and English 
Language Arts are nonpersistent. The standard deviation of the persistent teacher effect is 
between .12 and .19, similar to that found in the previous literature discussed above. 
 
Fact 3: Teachers Improve Substantially in Their First Few Years on the Job. 
Table 1 also reports the degree to which average teacher effects on student achievement 
differ from that of experienced teachers during the first few years on the job in these same two 
districts.  In both Los Angeles and New York, teacher effects on student achievement appear to 
rise rapidly during the first several years on the job and then flatten out.  This finding has been 
replicated in a number of states and districts (Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain, 2005; Clotfelter, 
Ladd, and Vigdor, 2006; Harris and Sass, 2006; Jacob, 2007).  When assigned to a first-year 
teacher, the average student gains .06 to .08 standard deviations of achievement less than 
observably similar students assigned to experienced teachers.   However, the achievement gains 
of students assigned to second-year teachers lagged those in more experienced teachers’ 
classrooms by only .01 to .04 standard deviations.   In Los Angeles, students of third-year 
teachers saw gains comparable to those of more experienced teachers, while there was a small 
difference for third-year teachers in New York (.01 to .02 standard deviations).   
  
Fact 4: The Main Cost of Teacher Turnover is the Reduction in Student Achievement when 
an Experienced Teacher is Replaced by a Novice, not Direct Hiring Costs.  
 Milanowski and Odden (2007) carefully studied costs of teacher recruitment and hiring in 
a large urban Midwestern school district.   They estimate total costs of roughly $8,200: recruiting 
costs per vacancy of $1,100 in central office staff time and $2,600 in school-level staff time, plus 
$4,500 for the cost of training a new teacher.  In addition, some of these costs will be defrayed 
by the salaries earned by new teachers, which are typically lower than the salaries of the teachers 
they replace. 
Based on the gains that teachers make in their first few years of experience, every time a 
school district loses an experienced teacher with two or more years of experience and is forced to 
hire a novice teacher, the students assigned to the novice teacher over the first two years of their 
career lose roughly .10 standard deviations in student achievement.  As discussed above, 
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estimates suggest a .10 standard deviation gain in math scores has a value of roughly $10,000 to 
$25,000 per student.  Thus, the economic cost of lost academic achievement when replacing an 
experienced elementary teacher with a novice would be roughly $10,000 to $25,000 times 20 
students per class—or $200,000 to $500,000. This is obviously a back-of-the-envelope 
calculation, but it dwarfs the direct costs of teacher hiring. 
 
Fact 5: School Leaders Have Very Little Ability to Select Effective Teachers During the 
Initial Hiring Process. 
Reliable screening at the hiring stage would be an efficient tool for raising student 
achievement because it avoids the cost of placing ineffective teachers in front of students.  
Unfortunately, there is scant evidence that school districts or principals can effectively separate 
effective and ineffective teachers when they make hiring decisions.  Indeed, this notion is 
supported by the fact that most of the variation in teacher effects occurs among teachers hired 
into the same school.   
One of the most interesting pieces of evidence on this topic comes from a natural 
experiment which occurred in California in the late 1990s (Kane and Staiger, 2005). Beginning 
in the academic year 1996–1997, the state of California provided cash incentives to school 
districts to keep class sizes in kindergarten through third grade to a maximum of 20 children.   
To take advantage of the state incentive, school districts throughout the state dramatically 
increased hiring of new elementary teachers.  In the years before 1997, Los Angeles Unified 
School District hired 1,200 to 1,400 elementary school teachers per year, but in 1997 Los 
Angeles nearly tripled the number of elementary school teachers it hired, to 3,335, and continued 
to hire at more than double its earlier level for the next five years.  
If the district were able to discern teacher effectiveness in the hiring process, we would 
have expected a large increase in hiring to have had a negative effect on the average 
effectiveness of the teachers hired.  Such an effect would likely have been heightened by the fact 
that nearly every other school district in California was on a hiring spree because of the same 
state law, the fact that teacher compensation in Los Angeles did not increase more than usual 
during this period, and that the proportion of new hires in L.A. without teaching credentials rose 
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from 59 percent to 72 percent.5 However, Kane and Staiger (2005) find that, despite the size of 
the hiring bubble, value added in the period 2001–2004 for teachers hired in 1997 was no worse 
than for teachers hired in the years immediately before 1997.6  Overall, there was no evidence 
that tripling the number of new hires had any effect on their average effectiveness in the 
classroom.7 
Other evidence on this issue comes from decades of work in which researchers have 
tried, unsuccessfully, to link teacher characteristics observable to both researchers and principals 
to student outcomes (see reviews by Hanushek, 1986, 1997; Jacob, 2007).  With the exception of 
teaching experience, there is little to suggest that the credentials commonly used to determine 
teacher certification and pay are related to teachers’ impacts on student outcomes.  Some studies 
find that a teacher’s academic background (like college grade point average or SAT test scores) 
is related to student outcomes, but Ballou (1996) finds that teaching applicants with strong 
academic records are no more likely to be hired by school principals. 
More recent work suggests that selecting teaching candidates who are likely to be 
effective is difficult, but not impossible.  For example, several studies have estimated the effect 
of novice teachers recruited under the Teach for America program (Decker, Mayer, and 
Glazerman, 2004; Boyd, Grossman, Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff, 2006; Kane, Rockoff, and 
Staiger, 2008).  Teach for America is highly selective, drawing applicants from the top 
universities in the country and offering positions to only a small fraction of the thousands of 
individuals who apply.  However, these applicants have not generally taken college courses in 
                                                 
5 It may seem surprising that the fraction of teachers without credentials didn’t rise by more, but 
the number of individuals with teaching certification that do not teach is quite large.  Data from 
the Baccalaureate and Beyond study indicate that roughly one in five college graduates receive 
teaching certification in the ten years after graduation, but 45 percent of college graduates that 
obtained teaching certification are not teaching, and 15 percent have never taught (author’s 
calculations using National Center for Education Statistics QuickStats on 6/8/2010).  
6 Their analysis focuses on grades two through five in Los Angeles from 2001 through 2004. By 
2001, roughly two-thirds of both the 1996 and 1997 hiring cohorts were still employed by the 
district; thus, there is little evidence to suggest any differential selective attrition for the larger 
cohort. Also, while their value-added model controls for baseline scores and other student 
characteristics, there was virtually no difference in the types of students to which the cohorts had 
been assigned. 
7 This evidence runs counter to the prevailing wisdom among some policy analysts that it was a 
decline in the average quality of the teaching force that accounts for the failure to see an increase 
in achievement in California resulting from the class size reduction (Bohrnstedt and Stecher, 
2002).  
 10 
K–12 education nor have they majored in education. Decker, Mayer, and Glazerman (2004) use 
random assignment to estimate the effect of the program in elementary schools and find that 
students assigned to Teach For America members scored 2 percentile points (0.095 standard 
deviations) higher in math and no higher in reading than those assigned to other teachers.  Using 
nonexperimental data from New York City, in Kane, Rockoff, and Staiger (2008), we find 
positive effects of Teach For America teachers in math of .02 standard deviations and no 
statistically significant effect in English Language Arts.  Boyd, Grossman, Lankford, Loeb, and 
Wyckoff (2006) report comparable results, also using data from New York City. 
More evidence comes from studies collecting data on recently-hired novice math teachers 
in New York City. In Rockoff, Jacob, Kane, and Staiger (forthcoming), we collected information 
on a number of nontraditional predictors of effectiveness—including teaching-specific content 
knowledge, cognitive ability, personality traits, feelings of self-efficacy, and scores on a 
commercially available teacher selection instrument—and then used these to predict a teacher’s 
effect on math achievement. When the variables were combined into two primary factors 
summarizing cognitive and noncognitive skills, teachers who were one standard deviation higher 
on either the cognitive or noncognitive factor were found to raise student achievement in math 
by .033 student-level standard deviations more than teachers with average skill levels.  Those 
who were one standard deviation higher on both measures were estimated to raise achievement 
by .066 standard deviations.   Rockoff and Speroni (2010) examined the achievement of students 
assigned to teachers recruited through an alternative certification program—the New York City 
Teaching Fellows—and asked whether achievement gains were higher for students assigned to 
teachers rated as more attractive candidates by the certification program’s interview protocol.  
They found no significant relationship with English Language Arts test scores and a small 
positive relationship with math test scores:  a one standard deviation in interview score was 
associated with .013 standard deviations higher math achievement gain. 
 
Implications for How We Should (and Should Not) Search for Effective Teachers 
Here, we first lay out a way of thinking about the appropriate search strategy for school 
leaders based on these empirical findings. Based on this approach, we then present simulation 
estimates of how these different strategies would affect average teacher productivity.  
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A Reservation Value or Cut-off Score Model 
Suppose that school districts do not observe any useful pre-hire signal—there are a 
substantial number of potential applicants for teaching jobs who appear to have the general skill 
level to succeed in teaching, but we cannot tell in advance which ones will actually succeed. 
However, after teachers accept a job, the school can observe the gains that students make in test 
scores. Thus, the principal faces a search problem: the principal draws teachers from the 
applicant pool, observes noisy signals over time about teacher productivity, and decides whether 
to dismiss unproductive teachers and start the process over again. In this kind of model, the 
optimal decision rule has a reservation property: at the end of a year, the principal makes a 
decision on whether to dismiss a teacher if the expected effectiveness of that teacher, given the 
information to date, lies below a reservation value.8  
At a broad level, the principal should set the cut-off score where the productivity of the 
marginal teacher is expected to be equal to the productivity of the average teacher. In other 
words, this decision rule tells principals to keep only the rookies who are expected to be better 
than the average teacher. Imagine if this were not true—that is, suppose the marginal teacher 
were less productive than the average teacher.  Then the school district could raise average 
performance by raising its standard for new hires by a small amount.  Likewise, if the marginal 
teacher accepted under the standard were more productive than the average teacher, then the 
district could raise average performance by lowering the cut-off score for new hires and adding 
one more above-average teacher.  This result is analogous to the usual result that average costs 
are minimized at the point where marginal cost equals average cost. 
However, determining the reservation value or cut-off score in practice will be complex. 
The optimal reservation value depends on a set of underlying parameters similar to those already 
discussed: the extent of variation in performance across teachers, the return to experience, the 
number of years before tenure, the exogenous turnover rate, the size of the applicant pool, and 
the magnitude of other hiring and firing costs. For example, if teachers are more heterogeneous, 
then the potential benefits of greater selection are higher. However, if there is more noise (and 
thus uncertainty) in the estimates of teacher heterogeneity, then the benefits of selection are 
                                                 
8  For a simple algebraic presentation of this model, with some discussion of its links to search 
models with imperfect information in labor markets, see the online appendix available with this 
paper at <http://www.e-jep.org>. 
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lower.  If the gains from teacher experience are worth more, then the cost of dismissing 
experienced teachers and replacing them with novices is larger. If the exogenous turnover rate of 
teachers is high, then the optimal cut-off for tenure falls because there is less benefit to giving 
tenure to highly effective teachers if they do not stay long. Overall, the principal must set the bar 
to trade off the short-term cost of replacing an experienced teacher with a rookie against the 
long-term benefit of selecting only the most effective teachers. 
In what follows, we report the results of Monte Carlo simulations that examine the 
consequences of different approaches to teacher evaluation and retention. We use evidence on 
key underlying parameters to calibrate the model; all of these values lie in the middle of the 
estimates reported for Los Angeles and New York City in Table 1. We set the standard deviation 
of the persistent teacher effect (in student-level standard deviation units) equal to 0.15, and the 
reliability of the value-added measure (the ratio of the persistent variance to total variance) equal 
to 40 percent. For the return to experience, we assume that a first- and second-year teacher’s 
value added is –0.07 and –0.02 student standard deviations below the value added of teachers in 
their third year or higher. We ignore the direct costs of hiring a new teacher.  Finally, we assume 
a maximum teaching career of 30 years and an exogenous turnover rate of 5 percent, which is 
approximately the proportion of experienced teachers who leave the Los Angeles and New York 
City districts each year. 
 
Tenure or Dismiss after One Year   
We begin with a basic example in which the principal must either dismiss or tenure a 
teacher after one year of teaching based on just one year of student value-added data. Figure 1 
reports the expected steady-state impact of dismissing a given proportion of teachers (the bottom 
axis) on value added of the average teacher (left axis, solid line) and on the proportion of the 
teacher workforce who are in their first year of teaching (right axis, dashed line).  
The implications of Figure 1 are stark. First, the simulation suggests there are substantial 
gains from using value-added information to dismiss ineffective teachers and that the principal 
should set a very high bar for tenure.  To maximize average value added, about 80 percent of 
teachers should be dismissed after their first year. This aggressive strategy would raise the 
average value added of teachers in the school to just over 0.08; put differently, the effectiveness 
of the average teacher (including the rookies) would be greater than roughly 70 percent of the 
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tenured teachers under the old system. Moreover, it is not the case that most of the gain comes 
from dismissing the very lowest-performing teachers.  Indeed, until the principal reaches the 
optimum, the gain to being increasingly selective in who receives tenure is roughly linear. For 
example, if the principal dismissed the 40 percent of first-year teachers with the lowest value 
added, rather than 80 percent, the average value added among teachers in the school would 
increase by roughly 0.045 in the long run.   
While these results are surprising relative to current practice, there are a number of clear 
reasons why principals might choose to dismiss a large proportion of novice teachers. Even 
unreliable performance measures such as value added can identify substantial and lasting 
differences across teachers. Differences in teacher effects are large and persistent relative to the 
short-lived costs of hiring a new teacher. Since the typical teacher getting tenure will teach for 
ten years or more, the benefit from setting a high tenure bar will be large. Of course, such 
unreliable measures make mistakes. But the long-run cost of retaining an ineffective teacher far 
outweighs the short-run cost of dismissing an effective teacher. Moreover, because of the 
uncertainty at the time of hire, new teachers have considerable option value; for every five new 
hires, one will be identified as a highly effective teacher and provide many years of valuable 
service.  
There are many reasons why these simulations could overstate the benefits or understate 
the costs of such an aggressive tenure policy, and we have tried to enumerate a number of them 
here.  In general, for reasonable variations in the parameter values, these issues do not alter our 
qualitative conclusions.  
First, we may have understated the hiring and firing costs facing a principal. As we 
discussed earlier, the main cost of turnover is the lower effectiveness of new teachers, which 
corresponds to a cost of well over $100,000 in terms of foregone future student earnings. 
However, even if we double the difference in value added between rookies and experienced 
teachers (that is, from 0.07 to .14 student level standard deviations), the optimal dismissal rate 
remains over 75 percent.   
Second, we may have understated turnover rates among tenured teachers, especially if 
principals focus on their own school (rather than the district as a whole) and highly effective 
teachers are more likely to move to other schools. Similarly, principals may discount the future 
more highly because of their own likelihood of leaving the school, or because they believe that 
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teacher effects will not persist into the future (although the evidence suggests otherwise). 
However, if we double the exogenous annual turnover rate from 5 to 10 percent, the optimal 
dismissal rate remains over 70 percent.  
Third, we may have understated the cost of recruiting teachers.  The simulation indicates 
that a dismissal rate of 80 percent would result in more than 20 percent of the workforce being 
novice teachers at any time, more than double the current proportion of novices in Los Angeles 
and New York City.  Districts would have to hire many more teachers to accommodate this 
strategy, and these new hires would presumably demand higher wages to compensate for the 
substantial risk of being dismissed.  This is particularly true if we continue to require costly up-
front teaching-specific training. However, even a doubling of current teacher salaries would not 
be enough to offset the benefits of an aggressive dismissal policy, since a .08 annual increase in 
student achievement is worth more than $100,000 per teacher.  
Fourth, our simulations focus on the steady state, and we have ignored what happens 
along the way. This may be important if we discount the earnings of future children relative to 
current children.  Specifically, for a school that starts with all new teachers, an aggressive 
dismissal policy will result in high fractions of inexperienced teachers in the short run even if the 
equilibrium percentage of rookies is lower. For example, if we compare a policy of retaining the 
top 20 percent of new teachers with retaining 90 percent, average teacher effectiveness would be 
slightly lower in the first two years after implementing the more aggressive policy, turn positive 
in year three, and approach the steady state gains after roughly ten years.  Nevertheless, we find 
the optimal dismissal rate is still above 70 percent for annual discount rates in a reasonable range 
(say 2 to 8 percent), and falls to 50 percent only with annual discount rates on the order of 15 
percent.   
Fifth, there may be spillover effects in teaching, where good teachers help raise the 
achievement of their colleagues students (Jackson and Bruegmann, 2009; Koedell, forthcoming). 
This has two offsetting effects in the context of our analysis. Spillover effects imply that our 
estimate of the variation in how teachers impact their own students is overstated (because some 
of the observed effect is due to their colleagues).  However, if this bias is roughly 20 percent, as 
suggested by Jackson and Bruegmann (2009), so that the true standard deviation in persistent 
teacher effects was 0.12 rather than 0.15, the optimal dismissal rate would still be 79 percent in 
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our model.  Moreover, spillover effects will also increase the benefits of filling schools entirely 
with highly effective teachers and could easily imply higher optimal dismissal rates. 
Sixth, we have assumed that teachers who do not receive tenure exit the teaching 
workforce.  If teaching effectiveness is measured with error and principals have no power to 
screen among candidates, then dismissed teachers could move to another school and hope for 
better luck in their evaluation. If this occurred, the average quality of the applicant pool would 
decline. This type of phenomenon—poorly performing teachers moving to new schools, 
typically those serving more disadvantaged students (discussed in Boyd, Grossman, Lankford, 
Loeb, and Wyckoff, 2008)—is already well-known in education, and is referred to as “the dance 
of the lemons.”  This suggests that principals could benefit their colleagues at other schools by 
sharing performance information on teachers.  However, if schools were highly selective in 
granting tenure, it might also be true that teachers who receive a bad signal regarding their 
effectiveness would have less incentive to “shop around.”9   
Seventh, there is evidence that the impact of a teacher on the achievement of current 
students may fade out over time as those students progress through their remaining years of 
school (Jacob, Lefgren, and Sims, 2008; Kane and Staiger, 2008).  It is unclear whether this 
greatly weakens the case for raising teacher quality.  We do not know whether fadeout is a 
general phenomenon or whether it is a result of current levels of heterogeneity in teacher 
effectiveness.  For example, having a highly effective teacher in the previous year may do a 
student little good if they are placed with a highly ineffective teacher this year, or if their 
classmates were placed with a highly ineffective teacher the previous year.  In other words, 
teacher effects might not fade out if a group of students is given a sequence of highly effective 
teachers.  Moreover, raising a student’s academic achievement as measured in a particular grade 
may still be valuable even if the student’s score in later grade levels do not remain at the 
                                                 
9 A similar complication arises if teaching skills are partially related to subject matter, grade 
level, or the teacher–school match.  The evidence on the specificity of teaching skill is mixed 
(Boyd, Grossman, Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff, 2008; Lockwood and McCaffrey, 2009; 
Jackson, 2010), but it is reasonable to believe that, say, a mediocre teacher of high school 
physics in Harlem may have made a good fifth grade math teacher in Brooklyn Heights, or vice 
versa.  If principals do have access to information on the past performance of teachers who did 
not make tenure, specificity in skill can simply be interpreted as an additional source of error.  
This may lead principals to be more willing to “take a chance” on a teacher who just missed 
tenure by trying them in a different subject, grade, or teaching environment.   
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improved level. For instance, a better knowledge of numerical operations may still be valuable in 
the labor market even if it does not lead to better test scores in algebra.  Nevertheless, we do 
view “fade-out” as a primary empirical issue, not just in studies of teachers, but in studies of 
educational interventions more broadly (for example, Currie and Thomas, 1995). 
Finally, we may have overstated the reliability of value-added measures. We address this 
issue in considerable detail below.  However, even if we cut the reliability of value added in half 
(from 40 to 20 percent), the optimal dismissal rate remains over 70 percent. 
 
The Effect of Changing the Time to Tenure Review 
In our next set of simulations, we evaluate how changing the time until tenure review 
affects the optimal dismissal rate and the average value added of teachers. The first column of 
Table 2 repeats the results from our benchmark simulations in which dismissal could only occur 
at the end of the first year. The next three columns allow the principal to delay tenure review 
until the second, third, or fourth year, and to gather more information about teacher effectiveness 
before making a decision regarding dismissal.  The next three columns require a delay in tenure 
review for 2 to 4 years, so that dismissal can occur only after multiple years of value-added data 
are available to the principal.  
Not surprisingly, giving a principal the option of waiting to gather more information 
produces some benefits. Average value added rises to about 0.10 standard deviations with the 
possibility of delaying tenure review to the fourth year, with most of the gain coming from 
delaying tenure until the second year. Even with the option to delay the tenure decision, the 
principal would still dismiss two-thirds of new hires after the first year, but would wait to 
dismiss some teachers for whom there is a reasonable chance that an additional year of data 
could lead to a better decision. Intuitively, the cut-off score for dismissing a new teacher rises 
with time on the job, because the option value of waiting to dismiss a teacher declines as the 
principal accumulates better information. In other words, to avoid unnecessary turnover the 
principal may choose to wait a year before dismissing a teacher who the principal believes is 
“below the bar” so long as there is a reasonable chance that this evaluation could change. Thus, 
the principal dismisses teachers whose expected effectiveness lies below a bar that increases with 
teacher experience.  Overall dismissal rates do not change much as the principal is allowed to 
 17 
wait until year 2, 3, or 4 to make a decision, but the extra time allows the principal to better 
identify the remaining subset of teachers for tenure. 
In contrast, requiring principals to delay tenure review—that is, removing the option of 
dismissal until year 2, 3, or 4—would lead to lower average teacher value added, relative to the 
baseline case.  Essentially, this policy forces principals to retain low-performing teachers 
additional years, and this outweighs the benefits of the additional information the principal 
would obtain by waiting to see additional years of performance data.  Note that this policy also 
leads to fewer teachers being dismissed overall, since the option value of hiring a new teacher 
(who may turn out to be ineffective and must be retained for several years) has fallen. 
 
Obtaining More Reliable Information at the Time of Hire 
We have assumed that principals have no useful information at the time of hire.  This 
implies that radical increases in hiring rates (as required by a dismissal rate of 80 percent) do not 
affect the quality of new hires—each individual is a random draw from a generally qualified 
applicant pool. But many districts and principals put substantial effort into screening and 
interviewing new hires, suggesting that even small amounts of information at the time of hire 
may be valuable. 
Figure 2 shows how changing the reliability of the pre-hire signal affects the optimal 
dismissal rate (right axis, dashed line), and the resulting value added of the average teacher in the 
school (left axis, solid line). For these simulations, we assumed that the principal could only 
dismiss teachers after the first year (T = 1). We also assumed that the pool of potential applicants 
was ten times the number needed to replace teachers leaving through exogenous turnover, 
corresponding to estimates that New York City and Los Angeles currently have about 10 
applicants for each position. Our baseline simulation corresponds to a reliability of 0 in the pre-
hire signal, at the far left in this figure. 
Figure 2 suggests that pre-hire information on teacher effectiveness is potentially quite 
valuable. Compared to having no information at the time of hire, a perfect pre-hire signal with 
100 percent reliability would nearly triple the gain to the value added of the teacher workforce, 
and of course would eliminate the need to dismiss teachers after hire. More interestingly, even a 
low reliability signal of 20 percent at the time of hire doubles the gain to the value added of the 
teacher workforce relative to the benchmark case with no pre-hire information. However, access 
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to a pre-hire signal does not eliminate the need to dismiss additional teachers after hire. As long 
as there is remaining uncertainty about teacher effectiveness among the teachers that are hired, 
there will be a benefit to dismissing additional teachers after observing classroom performance. 
 
Obtaining More Reliable Measures of On-the-Job Performance 
Figure 3 shows how changing the reliability of the on-the-job signal affects the optimal 
timing of tenure (regions delineated by dotted lines, labeled at top), the optimal dismissal rate 
(right axis, dashed line), and the resulting value added of the average teacher in the school (left 
axis, solid line). For these simulations, we assumed that the principal could only dismiss teachers 
at tenure time (T).  
Many school districts are currently engaged in efforts to improve the reliability with 
which they can measure teacher performance, through the use of additional information from 
classroom observation, student work, and student or parent surveys. Figure 3 suggests that more 
reliable measures of teacher performance are quite valuable. Relative to our baseline simulation, 
in which the reliability of the annual performance measure was 40 percent (.4 in the figure), a 
measure with perfect reliability would nearly double the gains from selecting effective teachers 
(to 0.14 standard deviations) while having little impact on the proportion of teachers dismissed. 
If districts relied on performance measures that were less reliable than our baseline case, the 
gains from selecting effective teachers would be reduced, and it would become optimal for the 
principal to wait longer before dismissing a teacher. Interestingly, the proportion of teachers 
dismissed does not decline much until the reliability of the performance measure drops below 5 
percent (.05 in the figure). Even very weak signals of teacher performance eventually identify 
differences between teachers that make the benefits of selectively awarding tenure swamp the 
cost of having to hire additional inexperienced teachers. 
  
Conclusion 
In the ongoing debate over how to improve teaching quality in public schools, there have 
been conflicting claims regarding the usefulness of currently available measures of teacher 
effectiveness.  For example, in reference to a proposed initiative to measure teacher effectiveness 
using student test scores, the head of the New York City teachers’ union Randi Weingarten 
stated: “There is no way that any of this current data could actually, fairly, honestly or with any 
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integrity be used to isolate the contributions of an individual teacher” (as reported by Medina, 
2008). In contrast, the U.S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan (2009) has stated: “I have an 
open mind about teacher evaluation, but we need to find a way to measure classroom success and 
teacher effectiveness. Pretending that student outcomes are not part of the equation is like 
pretending that professional basketball has nothing to do with the score.”  
Given the available evidence, we have tried to evaluate systematically how school leaders 
should use the currently available but imperfect measures of teacher effectiveness to recruit, 
evaluate, and retain teachers. Our simulations suggest that using existing information on teacher 
performance to aggressively select teachers would yield substantial annual gains in academic 
achievement of around 0.08 student level standard deviations. These are comparable to the 
annual test score gains found in recent experimental evaluations of charter schools (Hoxby and 
Murarka, 2009;  Abdulkadiroglu, Angrist, Dynarski, Kane, and Pathak, 2009) and comparable to 
the estimated annual impact of reducing class size in early elementary grades found in Project 
STAR (Krueger, 1999). Our analysis also suggests that there are substantial returns to investing 
in better information about teacher effectiveness, both at the time of hire and in the first few 
years on the job. Other measures of teacher performance, such as evaluations based on classroom 
observations, may be very useful. Finally, there may be other uses of this information that we did 
not consider in our analysis, such as for performance-based pay or targeted professional 
development, which would yield even larger gains. Systematically exploring the potential gains 
from these other uses would be valuable.  
There are many practical obstacles to implementing a policy that denies tenure to a large 
proportion of new teachers. First, large upfront investments in teaching credentials make very 
high rates of terminations hard to support in equilibrium. Given that there is little evidence that 
such credentials are related to teacher effectiveness, our results suggest that an aggressive 
dismissal policy should be complimented by an easy entry policy. For example, as an alternative 
to obtaining credentials, districts could create an alternative port of entry in which any college 
graduate (without a criminal record) could become certified if they performed well on the job in 
their first year or two. One could imagine such an alternative certification route being an 
attractive option for many applicants, and the teachers obtaining the resulting certification being 
highly valued by schools. If applicants were still uneasy about investing time and effort in the 
difficult first years of teaching, districts could redesign the process to limit the up-front costs of a 
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“tryout” (for example, initially evaluating new teachers using brief summer school courses), and 
allow them to gain  better pre-hire information at low cost.. Similarly, it is interesting to consider 
a workforce development model that tries both to minimize the exposure of students to untested 
teachers and generate early-career information on teacher effectiveness.  For example, instead of 
giving new teachers a full load of students and/or courses, principals could assign them to a 
small group of students or a single course and then use this limited teaching role to collect 
performance information.10  Of course, we do not know how reliably such information would 
predict later performance with a full set of teaching responsibilities, but we suspect it would be 
more informative than knowing where someone attended college or what they scored on a 
standardized certification examination.  
Despite these issues and obstacles, the general message of our analysis remains. The 
current system, which focuses on credentials at the time of hire and grants tenure as a matter of 
course, is at odds with decades of evidence on teacher effectiveness. Instead, teacher recruitment 
and retention policies should focus on improving our methods of teacher evaluation and use 
admittedly imperfect measures of teacher effectiveness to identify and retain only the best 
teachers early in their teaching careers. 
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Table 1  
Evidence on Teacher Value Added from Schools in Los Angeles and New York City 
(teacher value added measured in standard deviations of student performance) 
 
    Los Angeles    New York City 
    Math 
English 
Language 




Variation in Teacher Value Added:             
   Standard deviation of annual value-added 
measure   0.27 0.23   0.25 0.23 
   Reliability of annual value-added measure   0.50 0.37   0.39 0.28 
   Implied standard deviation of persistent 
teacher effect   0.19 0.14   0.15 0.12 
Difference in Value Added Relative to 
Teachers with 3+ Years Experience:            
   No experience teaching (novice)   –0.08 –0.06   –0.07 –0.07 
   One year of experience teaching   –0.02 –0.01   –0.03 –0.04 
   Two years of experience teaching   –0.01 –0.01   –0.02 –0.02 
 
Notes: Teacher value-added estimates are from analysis of data on 4th and 5th graders in years 
2000–2003 for Los Angeles and 2000–2005 for New York City. Teacher value added is 
measured in standard deviations of student performance. Reliability of the value-added measure 
refers to the correlation of the value-added measure across classrooms taught by the same 
teacher. Estimates are based on regressions of student achievement that include student-level 
controls for baseline test scores, race/ethnicity, special education, English Language Learners 
(ELL), and free lunch status; classroom peer means of the student-level characteristics; and 
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Notes: Proportion dismissed (x-axis) refers to the proportion of teachers with the lowest value-
added estimates that are dismissed after their first year. The solid line (and left axis) shows the 
steady state impact of each proportion dismissed on the value added of the average teacher, 
including those in their first year of teaching. Teacher value added is measured in standard 
deviations of student performance. The dashed line (and right axis) shows the steady state impact 
of each proportion dismissed on the proportion of the teacher workforce in the first (or novice) 







Effect of Delaying Tenure Decisions beyond the First Year, Options vs. Requirements 
  
Baseline: 
Dismissal at  
 T  = 1 
 
Dismissal allowed at 
any time until   
Require dismissal  
only occur at time 
  T  = 1  T  = 2 T  = 3 T  = 4   T  = 2 T  = 3 T  = 4 
Average value added 0.080 
 
0.095 0.099 0.101   0.075 0.068 0.061 
% Dismissed overall 81% 
 
83% 84% 84%   75% 71% 68% 
% Dismissed annually                  
At T = 1 81%  67% 67% 67%         
At T = 2    16% 8% 8%   75%     
At T = 3      9% 4%     71%   




Notes: Average value added refers to the average level of teachers' value-added estimates in the 
steady state under an optimal dismissal policy, and it includes both untenured and tenured 
teachers. (Teacher value added is measured in standard deviations of student performance.)  
“Percentages dismissed” refers to the percent of a single cohort of newly hired teachers 




Effect of Increasing the Reliability of the Pre-hire Performance Signal on Value Added of 
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Note: Reliability (x-axis) refers to the proportion of variance in the pre-hire performance signal 
that is due to the persistent component of teacher performance.  The solid line (and left axis) 
shows the steady state impact of reliability on the value added of the average teacher, including 
those in their first year of teaching, based on the optimal proportion of teachers dismissed after 
one year. (Teacher value added is measured in standard deviations of student performance.) The 
dashed line (and right axis) shows the steady state impact of reliability on the optimal proportion 




Effect of Reliability of the Annual Performance Measure on Optimal Timing of Tenure, 
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Note: Figure 3 shows how changing the reliability of the on-the-job signal affects the optimal 
timing of tenure (regions delineated by dotted lines, labeled at top), the optimal dismissal rate 
(right axis, dashed line), and the resulting value added of the average teacher in the school (left 
axis, solid line). For these simulations, we assumed that the principal could only dismiss teachers 
at tenure time (T). Reliability (x-axis) refers to the correlation of the annual performance measure 
across years within the same teacher.  The dashed line (and right axis) shows the steady state 
impact of reliability on the proportion dismissed.  The solid line (and left axis) shows the steady 
state impact of reliability on the value added of the average teacher, including those in their first 
year of teaching, based on the optimal proportion of teachers dismissed after the optimal waiting 
period (T). (Teacher value added is measured in standard deviations of student performance.) 
The regions separated by horizontal dotted lines denote the optimal year in which the tenure 
decision should be made (T) for different levels of reliability. 
 
 
